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Abstract 
 
We show that standard statistical tests of OPEC behavior have very low power across a 
wide range of alternative hypotheses regarding market structure.  Consequently, it is 
difficult, given the current availability and precision of data on demand and costs, to 
distinguish collusive from competitive behavior in the world oil market.  This, along with 
other factors, may account for the largely inconclusive nature of findings so far reported 
in the empirical literature on OPEC.  We apply a new approach for examining alternative 
hypotheses and find strong evidence of cooperative behavior among OPEC members.  
Our results also suggest that OPEC’s formal quota mechanism, introduced in 1982 to 
replace a system based on posted prices, increased transactions costs within the 
organization.  We do not find strong evidence to support the view that Saudi Arabia has 
played the role of dominant producer within the cartel.  (JEL:  D43, L11, L13, Q41) 
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Inscrutable OPEC?  Behavioral Tests of the Cartel Hypothesis 
I.  Introduction 
 Since OPEC achieved its considerable notoriety in the early 1970s, substantial 
public interest and numerous scholarly investigations have focused on the collective 
decisions and economic impact of this particularly long-lived association of sovereign oil 
producers.  Conflicting interpretations of OPEC and its influence have been advanced, 
each built from a different blend of the principles of competitive, collusive, and 
monopolistic behavior.  Whether OPEC is viewed as a benign, potent, or simply highly 
erratic influence on the market depends largely on the choice among these several 
competing perspectives and the assumptions that frame them. 
 The competing OPEC stories find substantial support in different quarters.  One 
can cite bits and pieces of evidence that are consistent with each of the various 
hypotheses, and that have been used to rationalize the conflicting points of view and 
sustain debate.  Having surveyed the first decade of OPEC research, Gately (1984) 
concluded that it remained “an open question how best to design a model of the behavior 
of OPEC.”  Hoping to steer subsequent research efforts in a direction that might help to 
narrow the field, Griffin (1985, p. 954) pointed to one fundamental problem: 
The standard practice to date has been to reach onto the shelf of economic 
models, to select one, to validate its choice by pointing to selected events 
not inconsistent with the model’s predictions, and then to proceed with 
some normative exercise.  (emphasis added) 
As Griffin realized, evidence that is “not inconsistent” with a particular point of view is 
hardly conclusive, and certainly not a proper basis for choosing between the alternatives.  
Knowledge increases only when research uncovers evidence that is inconsistent with one 
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or more hypotheses, not by tabulating bits of evidence that are consistent with a selected 
point of view.1  This is an important distinction in the current context because, as shown 
below, behavioral models of OPEC from the entire spectrum of market structures give 
many predictions that are indistinguishable from one another, at least at the level of 
empirical certitude that characterizes the world oil market.  The consequence, as I argue 
below, is that much of the evidence that has been cited regarding OPEC’s behavior is 
mutually consistent with a wide range of apparently conflicting models.  Thus, Griffin’s 
plea that researchers begin to search more systematically for information that would 
distinguish one hypothesis from another, not simply to compile data that appears to 
“support” an individual hypothesis considered in isolation. 
II.  Notes on the Literature 
 The subsequent empirical literature, which includes Griffin’s (1985) own path 
breaking inquiry plus a series of worthy contributions by Loderer (1985), Geroski, Ulph, 
and Ulph (1987), Green (1988), Jones (1990), Dahl and Yücel (1991), Griffin and 
Nielson (1994), Gülen (1996), Gault, et. al. (1999), Alhajji and Huettner (2000a & 
2000b), Spilimbergo (2001), and Ramcharran (2002), remains largely inconclusive 
regarding the behavior and impact of OPEC despite the best efforts of those authors.  Few 
interesting hypotheses have been rejected and therefore little has been clarified regarding 
OPEC’s actual or intended influence on the market.  Behavioral patterns are sometimes 
discernable, but those that have been found tend to be consistent with multiple 
hypotheses.2 
                                                          
1 This criticism was central to Stigler’s (1964) attack upon those “immortal theories” of the industrial 
organization literature that defied falsification for lack of testable hypotheses. 
2 This review covers only the “econometric” portion of the empirical literature (i.e., studies that primarily 
apply statistical analysis to quantifiable market data) because that approach is the subject of my own 
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 For example, Gülen (1996, p. 43) looks for indications that the output levels of 
individual OPEC members tend to move in parallel because, as he notes: “If OPEC was 
an effective cartel sharing the market among its members, there would be a long-run 
relationship between each member’s production and total OPEC output.”  But, although 
parallel movement is not inconsistent with the cartel hypothesis, neither is it inconsistent 
with the competitive hypothesis since the output levels of perfectly competitive firms 
should be expected to move together in response to demand shocks and systematic cost 
fluctuations that impact the entire industry.  Gülen’s search, therefore, is for evidence that 
would at best be inconclusive.  Griffin (1985, p. 957) also noted the empirical tendency 
for parallel movement among OPEC members’ production levels and interpreted 
parallelism as evidence that OPEC is a “real cartel with at least partially effective output 
coordination.”  The same critique applies, however:  circumstances that would induce 
cartel members to increase or decrease their outputs in concert (i.e., demand and cost 
fluctuations) would also induce perfectly competitive firms to “coordinate” their output 
levels. 3  How to distinguish the two empirically? 
 Alhajji and Huettner (2000b) focus on the estimated price elasticity of demand for 
OPEC (or alternatively, Saudi) oil, noting in particular that a monopolist would not 
choose to operate on the inelastic portion of its demand curve.  Thus, estimated demand 
elasticities numerically below –1 would constitute evidence not inconsistent with the 
cartel hypothesis.  Neither would such results be inconsistent with the perfectly 
competitive hypothesis, however, since it is quite easy to envision market conditions 
                                                                                                                                                                             
inquiry.  Many important insights have come from the case study approach; a literature that includes 
numerous works carefully distilled from close observation and richly detailed assessments of the diverse 
aspects (qualitative as well as quantitative) that characterize OPEC and its membership.  Notable recent 
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under which a perfectly competitive industry comes to equilibrium at a point on the upper 
half of the demand curve (i.e., where market demand is elastic).4   
 As further example of the ambiguity of market predictions, consider Libecap’s 
(1989) hypothesis, also later employed by Dahl and Yücel (1991), that so-called “swing” 
producers (such as the Texas Railroad Commission in Libecap’s context or Saudi Arabia 
and/or the cartel “core” for Dahl and Yücel) should be expected to exhibit larger 
proportionate changes in production than the rest of the market.  The whole production of 
an individual swing producer is vulnerable, after all, to relatively small percentage 
fluctuations in aggregate output from the rest of the group.  On this basis, a high 
coefficient of variation in individual output, compared to the market as a whole, would 
constitute evidence not inconsistent with the status of a swing producer.  On the other 
hand, neither is a high coefficient of variation inconsistent with the status of a perfectly 
competitive producer.  For example, if output variations of all producers are essentially 
random (e.g., governed by weather, unpredictable drilling results, unscheduled 
maintenance, etc.), then the coefficient of variation for individual producers will 
necessarily exceed that of the group as a whole (because relative to the random 
fluctuations in output, the group enjoys greater benefits of diversification than the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
examples include the works by Adelman (1995 and 2002), Amuzegar (1999), Claes (2001), Mitchell et. al. 
(2001), and Kohl (2002).  Mabro (1998) surveys a much wider swath of the OPEC literature. 
3 Alhajji and Huettner (2000a, page 126) have previously noted this ambiguity. 
4 Alhajji and Huettner (2000b, p. 45) actually claim to have rejected the hypothesis that OPEC’s demand 
elasticity is less than –1, which as they indicate would constitute evidence that “OPEC is not a profit-
maximizing cartel.” (emphasis added)  Their reported result does not, however, rule out the possibility that 
OPEC might be acting as a cautious or restrained cartel; i.e., raising the market price somewhat, but not to 
the full degree of a profit-maximizing monopolist.  In other words, the elasticity-based test must in 
principle be inconclusive on the question of whether OPEC has affected the market price.  As it happens, 
Alhajji and Huettner’s statistical rejection of the elasticity hypothesis appears to have been in error (see 
discussion below), so the question is moot. 
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individual producer).5  The same would be true in any competitive industry to the extent 
that random output fluctuations at the level of the individual producer are significant.  
How then to distinguish the swing producer from the competitive producer? 
 Separately, Dahl and Yücel (1991, p. 126) observe that low-cost producers in a 
profit-maximizing cartel would be expected to produce more than high-cost producers, 
and that an indicator of marginal cost should therefore enter significantly (and negatively) 
into the production equation for cartel members, a result which they find in the data.6  
However, the same volumetric relationships—low-cost producers dominating high-cost 
producers—would be expected to hold among perfectly competitive producers, and 
therefore the pattern of evidence is again consistent with models located at opposite ends 
of the economic spectrum and the results are inconclusive.  
 As further evidence of the limited power to distinguish among alternative OPEC 
hypotheses, we cite the study by Gault, et. al. (1999) of OPEC’s apportionment of its 
total output target among individual members; i.e., the determination of individual 
quotas.  Although the authors were able to form a preference for certain models over 
others on the basis of parsimony, none of the four tested models of quota assignments 
were statistically inconsistent with the data.   
 Thus, despite a continuing series of statistical investigations that carefully 
scrutinize pricing impacts as well as production decisions, the empirical literature has 
failed to produce clear evidence regarding the nature of OPEC behavior, whether 
                                                          
5 Let there be N producers in the industry.  Denote the ith producer’s output level qi, with mean µ and 
variance σ2.  If output fluctuations are assumed to be independent, aggregate output is then given by Q = 
Σqi, with mean Nµ and variance Nσ2.  By definition, the coefficient of variation of an individual firm’s 
output level is c = σ/µ, and for the industry it must be C = √Nσ/Nµ  =  c/√N  <  c. 
6 On purely theoretical grounds, output allocations to individual members should vary inversely with the 
average cost of production, whereas marginal costs should be equalized in order to minimize the total cost 
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competitive or otherwise.  There are some notable individual exceptions, of course—
instances where particular researchers have been able to reject one model or hypothesis in 
favor of another.  However, the pattern of such rejections is sparse and confined for the 
most part to the domain of highly specialized and therefore relatively uninteresting 
hypotheses. 
 Griffin (1985), for example, is able to reject the “constant market sharing” variant 
of the cartel hypothesis in ten of eleven instances, but this is an extreme proposition (i.e., 
members’ take fixed shares in total output independently of the price level) that would 
characterize the production shares of a profit-maximizing cartel only by coincidence.  In 
general, shares of cartel members should be expected to fluctuate with the price level in 
accordance with the differential elasticities of members’ individual marginal cost 
schedules.7  Griffin is not able to reject this more general variant of the cartel hypothesis 
in any of the eleven instances investigated.  Jones (1990), who extended Griffin’s 
estimates to a later time period, finds essentially the same result. 
 Griffin (1985) is also able to reject in all ten instances the “strict” version of the 
target revenue hypothesis (which maintains that producers vary production inversely with 
price to maintain a constant level of revenue commensurate with exogenous investment 
needs).  However, the “partial” variant of this hypothesis, in which exogenous investment 
requirements are assumed to drive production, but to a lesser degree, can be rejected in 
only one of the ten instances.8  The results of Dahl and Yücel (1991), based on a larger 
sample of data, are consistent with Griffin:  the strict version of the target revenue model 
                                                                                                                                                                             
of the cartel’s output.  In practical terms, however, there is enough ambiguity between empirical measures 
of average and marginal cost to perhaps overlook this distinction. 
7 Of course, the shares of competitive producers would be expected to fluctuate similarly. 
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can be rejected in every instance, but the partial variant can never be.  Alhajji and 
Huettner’s (2000a) detailed examination of the target revenue hypothesis also finds it 
relatively easy to reject the extreme form, but much more difficult to reject the more 
plausible, “weak” forms of this model. 
 Loderer’s (1985) approach is somewhat different, eschewing any behavioral 
model by which to describe or predict OPEC’s specific actions in lieu of a simple 
empirical test of market impact.  Specifically, Loderer takes as null hypothesis the 
proposition that OPEC policies (as agreed upon and announced at the series of 34 regular 
OPEC meetings that were held during the interval 1974-1983) had no impact on market 
prices.  A rejection of the null would establish market impact and therefore open the door 
to a line of more specific questions regarding the nature of OPEC policies and actions 
that created the impact, and the identity of OPEC members that were instrumental in 
achieving this result.  As Loderer acknowledges, however, rejection of the null would be 
“consistent with several explanations of the nature of OPEC.  It could, for instance, be an 
effective cartel, or it could be an organization of noncooperative oligopolists.”  Price 
impact, in other words, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence of an 
effective cartel.  We are left again with inconclusive results even in the event that the null 
hypothesis is rejected.  In fact, Loderer is unable to reject the null hypothesis of no 
impact for the years, 1974-80, when the most pronounced price increases occurred.  Only 
during the last three years of his sample, 1981-83, (during which prices were generally in 
decline) is the evidence strong enough to reject the null; but even for that short 
                                                                                                                                                                             
8 Recall that false rejections (type I errors) are expected to occur with certain limited frequency in 
accordance with the level of significance of the test employed. 
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subinterval we are then left to sort through unspecified alternatives:  collusion, non-
cooperative oligopoly, mere interdependence, etc. 
 Two particularly enlightening empirical studies argue that OPEC’s behavior 
varies over time—vacillating between cooperative and competitive modes, depending on 
circumstances—and therefore cannot be adequately described by any simple hypothesis.9  
Geroski, Ulph, and Ulph (1987) specify a partially altruistic objective function for each 
OPEC member that incorporates variable weights on its own profits and the profits of 
other members.  Within this framework, the authors are able to reject the “constant-
behavior” hypothesis, and moreover to demonstrate that observed actions conform 
roughly to the “tit-for-tat” game strategy (at least during their sample period of 1966-
1981), which is a time-varying combination of cooperative and competitive modes of 
behavior.  Similarly, Griffin and Neilson (1994) find evidence that, subsequent to the oil 
price crash of 1985-1986, Saudi Arabia adopted a tit-for-tat production strategy that 
alternately disciplines and rewards other cartel members.  While both of these studies 
advance considerably our comprehension of the richness and complexity of OPEC 
behavior, they also reinforce the notion that it is possible to find bits of behavioral 
evidence in the historical record that are consistent with a wide range of alternative 
hypotheses—therefore making it difficult to reject any.10 
                                                          
9 Clearly, the behavior of OPEC seems to vary over time, so models that do not assume a fixed posture 
have this in their favor.  Whether that variation is systematic in some manner that can be captured within an 
economic model is another matter. 
10 These findings bolster Adelman’s long-held position that OPEC is an inconsistent, sometimes bumbling, 
sometimes cohesive, but always vacillating federation of producers.  See, for example, Adelman (1980, 
1982, 1995, and 2002). 
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Some Misreported Results 
 Apart from the results described above, a number of other inferences presented in 
previous studies are simply incorrect and must be discounted.  Although it would be 
impossible to dissect each and every questionable inference to be found in this broad and 
diverse literature, a brief discussion of several misreported results may be instructive. 
 Spilimbergo (2001, page 349 and Table 3), for example, makes the elementary 
logical mistake of concluding that failure to reject his null hypothesis (i.e., that OPEC 
acts competitively) constitutes a rejection of the alternative.  The proper interpretation is 
that his results are not strong enough to distinguish between the null hypothesis and its 
alternative, and therefore simply inconclusive.  Dahl and Yücel (1991, page 121 and 
Table 1) commit the same error in reporting that the hypothesis of dynamic behavior 
(long-term planning horizon) among OPEC producers is “strongly rejected,” when in fact 
their statistical result establishes only that the null hypothesis of non-dynamic behavior 
(short-term planning horizon) can not be rejected. 
 Alhajji and Huettner’s (2000b) test of whether OPEC producers have exploited 
their market power by limiting output to the point where marginal cost equals marginal 
revenue is hampered at the outset by the authors’ reliance on flawed cost estimates that 
would seem to misrepresent the level of marginal cost in each producing country, and 
their failure to account for the uncertainty that surrounds these estimates (cf. section III of 
this paper).11  More troubling is the fact that the demand elasticities they report, and upon 
                                                          
11 Their marginal cost estimate for each OPEC country consists of three components: (a) extraction cost, (b) 
royalties, and (c) per barrel military expenditures (which proxy for “security costs” of production).  Each 
component seems badly flawed: (a) the extraction cost estimate makes no provision for geological and 
operating differences between countries or for economic changes over the boom-bust cycle of extraction—
it is simply assumed to be 50 cents per barrel in 1970 and increasing thereafter at the rate of 3 percent per 
annum; (b) royalties are assumed to be a uniform 17 percent of revenues for all OPEC countries, but since 
the respective governments are the owners of the resource, they are paying this component of “cost” to 
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which their tests are built, are inconsistent with their estimated demand equations; and the 
corrected elasticity estimates would in most cases render inconclusive their reported 
rejections of the null hypothesis.12 
 Dahl and Yücel (1991) and Gülen (1996) test the null hypothesis that production 
levels of OPEC members are not cointegrated, where rejection would imply that 
production levels tend to move together.  It has already been noted, of course, that 
outputs might be expected to move together whether producers are competitive rivals or 
cartel collaborators, so rejection of the null hypothesis would leave matters quite unclear.  
In any event, Dahl and Yücel are almost never able to reject the null hypothesis, which 
leaves matters equally unclear.  Gülen is able to reject the null hypothesis more often, but 
the pattern of rejections (across time and countries) is still infrequent and erratic.13  
Moreover, cointegration tests presume that production series from the respective regions 
are nonstationary—which is to say unbounded.  The very foundation of this approach, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
themselves and it is only an illusion; and (c) the military expenditures of each country can be rationalized 
in part as protection to ensure the security of that nation’s oil reserves and production facilities, but those 
expenditures remain the same whether output rises or falls by 10 percent; i.e., they are fixed rather than 
variable. 
12Alhajji and Huettner (2000b) estimate the elasticity of world oil demand (Ew) to be -0.251 and the 
elasticity of non-OPEC supply (Eno) to be 0.290 (see their Table 2).  The elasticity of residual demand for 
OPEC oil (Eo) can then be inferred from the formula:  Eo = Ew/s – Eno(1-s)/s, where s = OPEC’s share of 
world output.  The authors report only a few of the computed values of Eo, on which their tests are based.  
For example, they give the figure Eo = –0.1644 for the first quarter of 1983 and claim that in no quarter was 
Eo algebraically below –0.2209.  By the preceding formula, their 1983 figure would imply that OPEC 
produced 119% of worldwide output (s = 1.19) during that quarter.  Based on the values of Ew and Eno in 
their Table 2 and OPEC’s actual market share for first quarter of 1983 (30.1% according to monthly 
production statistics of the U.S. Energy Information Administration), the correct value for the elasticity of 
residual demand for OPEC oil that quarter would be Eo = –1.507 (not –0.1644 as reported).  Small 
discrepancies in the reported elasticity might result from differences in quarterly market shares computed 
from consumption versus production data (the difference representing changes in inventories), but the 
apparent discrepancy here is too large to be accounted for in that manner.  Corrected values for the 
elasticity of residual demand for OPEC oil during the authors’ entire estimation period range from –1.66 to 
–0.67, and fall into the elastic range 58 percent of the time, including the entire subinterval from April 1981 
to November 1992.  These corrected values are more consistent with the results of Geroski, Ulph, and Ulph 
(1987, page 81) who in their earlier study found the elasticity of demand for OPEC oil to be close to or less 
than –1.00 after 1973. 
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therefore, hardly seems consistent with the physical manner in which oil resources are 
known to be found and produced.  The statistical power of cointegration tests is also 
known to be low.  Consider, for example, two producers:  one whose production varies 
randomly over time within some fixed band, and another who makes periodic production 
adjustments that exactly offset the variations of the first.  Although the second producer 
performs the role of swing producer perfectly, the cointegration approach would not 
detect it since neither production series is nonstationary, which precludes the 
cointegration test in the first place.14 
 Green (1988) argues, but without providing any measure of statistical 
significance, that OPEC appears to act as a swing producer over the seasonal cycle—
raising production during the colder winter months when demand is peaking and reducing 
production during the remainder of the year.  It is not clear why competitive producers 
should not be expected to respond similarly to these seasonal demand cycles, either 
through direct production increases or inventory liquidation, unless the cycles were fully 
anticipated and offset by the actions of the swing producer, of course.  But further 
examination of the underlying data seems to remove that possibility and therefore to 
undermine Green’s interpretation:  Holding other things constant, OPEC’s average 
production is lowest during the first two months of the year (see Green’s Figure 1), those 
being the months that are typically the coldest and which would (by Green’s argument) 
provide the greatest scope for OPEC to increase its own output without upsetting the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
13 The scope of statistical transformations that Gülen must apply to the production series to facilitate the 
cointegration tests is also surprisingly inconsistent, varying in the case of Nigeria from zero monthly lags 
(for the 1965-1993 interval) to eleven monthly lags (for the 1974-1993 subinterval).  
14 On the basis of cointegration tests, Libecap (1989, page 846) was unable to find any evidence that Texas 
played the role of swing producer under the guise of the Interstate Oil Compact Commission, although the 
IOCC clearly acted as a well documented and highly successful production cartel in the U.S. oil market 
throughout the middle third of the twentieth century.   
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market price.  Estimates of residual demand for OPEC oil by Geroski, Ulph, and Ulph 
(1987, p. 81) show the seasonal and temperature variables to be statistically insignificant 
in any event. 
 Finally, we must consider Griffin’s (1985) reported rejection of the “competitive” 
hypothesis in five of the eleven OPEC countries examined.  This result, if confirmed, 
would certainly constitute a substantial piece of evidence regarding one of the most 
central issues in the OPEC debate.  For that reason alone, it bears closer scrutiny.  Due to 
data limitations that Griffin readily acknowledged, his “competitive” model is limited to 
a simple bivariate linear equation that relates a country’s output to the prevailing price 
level.  Griffin’s “rejection” of the competitive hypothesis is caused in each instance by 
the finding of a significant negative relationship between a given country’s output and 
price.  What is potentially misleading is the exclusion of costs from the estimated 
relationship.  Competitive behavior implies that, if a producer’s costs are held constant, 
then price and output should move in concert.  Experience within the petroleum industry, 
particularly during Griffin’s sample period (1971-1983), has been that each instance of 
significant price escalation has seen significant cost escalation too, as the rush of drilling 
activity drove factor prices upwards.  The cost data that would control for this 
confounding effect were not available to Griffin, and therefore excluded from the 
estimated equation.  Thus, it is not clear whether the reported rejections signify genuine 
deviations from competitive behavior or the impact of omitted variables.15  Jones (1990) 
was able to reject the competitive hypothesis for only two of eleven OPEC members in 
his extension of Griffin’s analysis to the 1983-1988 interval.  Ramcharran (2002) was 
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likewise able to reject the competitive hypothesis for only two OPEC members in his 
more recent extension.16  Watkins and Streifel (1998) obtained similar, but equally 
ambiguous results for the OPEC segment of their much broader study of oil supply 
functions:  among the eleven OPEC members, five showed a positive relationship 
between the value of reserves and the rate of reserve additions (of which two were 
significant), and six showed a negative relationship (again two were significant). 
III.  The Power to Distinguish Monopoly from Competition 
 One prediction that is hardly ambiguous is that the exercise of market power—
whether by a monopolist or a cartel—leads to a higher price than perfect competition.  
Consider a group of producers who are suspected of colluding.  In addition, let there be a 
“competitive fringe” of price-taking producers whose output supplements that of the 
suspected cartel.  The question is whether it is possible to properly diagnose the actions 
of the cartel.  We set forth the two possible extremes regarding their behavior: 
Ho:  (perfect competition)    MCi  =  P,  all i. 
Ha:  (perfect cartel—multi-plant monopoly);   MCi  =  P(1+1/εr), all i. 
where:  Qr(P) = Qd(P)  –  Qf(P) (total demand less fringe supply) 
  εr = εd/s  -  εf (1-s)/s (elasticity of residual demand) 
  1-s = Qf/Qd   (fringe market share) 
                                                                                                                                                                             
15 This effect may be more pronounced in the U.S. than in the OPEC countries, and Adelman’s (1992) 
results suggest that even in the U.S. its importance is moderated by other factors.  In fairness, my results 
(reported later) tend to corroborate and strengthen Griffin’s conclusions. 
16 Ramcharran is able to reject only twice at the conventional 5% significance level.  He reports a greater 
number of rejections, but upon inspection those are based on a looser standard. 
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This specification is a deliberate juxtaposition of the two most extreme hypotheses 
regarding market behavior; i.e.,  a contrast that is expected to generate the widest (and 
most easily discernable) difference in market prices and output levels.17 
 Even if the alternative hypothesis is true, the ability to reject the null depends on 
our having good estimates of marginal cost and the elasticity of residual demand.  We 
cannot judge whether marginal cost lies closer to marginal revenue or price without 
empirical knowledge of these benchmarks.18  Formally, the conventional one-sided test 
(with significance level = α) stipulates: 
 Reject Ho if: α>σ
− zMCP
MC
 
 
 Otherwise: Do not reject Ho; 
 
where:  MC = unbiased estimate of marginal cost, 
  MCσ  = standard deviation of MC . 
 The power of this test is by definition the probability of rejecting the null 
hypothesis given that the alternative is true.  Using E( MC ) to represent the expected 
value of the marginal cost estimate, we have: 
 Power = ( ) 







ε+=>σ
−
α
rMC
11PMCEzMCPPr  
  = ( ) 






ε+=σ−< α rMC
11PMCE|zPMCPr  
                                                          
17 Levin (1988) outlines nonrestrictive conditions that ensure that the market price will ascend as we 
compare the perfectly competitive, Cournot, Stackelberg, and collusive monopoly equilibria. 
18 Cartel members are assumed to charge a uniform price to all customers.  Price discrimination might 
provide prima facie evidence of market power, but we leave that aside. 
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 = ( ) ( )



σ
ε+−σ−<σ
ε+− α
MC
rMC
MC
r
/11PzP/11PMCPr  
 = 



σε−−< α MCr
PzzPr ; 
where the last step depends on the assumption that the cost estimate is normally 
distributed around its mean. 
 For purposes of benchmarking the power calculations, we may describe the 
precision of the marginal cost estimate in terms of the coefficient of variation (λ): 
( )MCE
MC
σ=λ , 
which permits the power to be written as: 
Power = ( )


ε+λε−−< α rr /11P
PzzPr  
 = ( )


ε+λ−−< α r1
1zzPr . 
Note that (1+εr) < 0 under the alternative hypothesis (the elasticity is not defined as an 
absolute value), and that Pr[z < −zα] = α by definition, thus the power of the test can not 
drop below α.  But, for the power to be substantially greater than α (which gives the 
probability of rejection due to mistaken judgment), the denominator of the right-hand 
term must be small.  There are three conclusions, none surprising: 
a. The power to distinguish competition from collusion increases as precision of the 
marginal cost estimate improves (λ → 0); 
b. The power to distinguish competition from collusion also increases as the 
elasticity of residual demand decreases in absolute value (εr → −1 from below); 
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c. The power of the test is lower than reported above if producers commit random 
optimization errors; in which case the alternative hypothesis must be restated as 
MCi  =  P(1+1/εr) + ei, where ei represents random error in attaining the first-order 
conditions of profit maximization.  The true power would be obtained by adding 
the optimization standard error to the cost estimation standard error in the 
foregoing expressions.19 
 Even under the favorable but unlikely assumption that members of the cartel 
never make pricing errors, the power to reject the competitive hypothesis is extremely 
low, at least under realistic assumptions regarding the structure of the world oil market 
and the precision of our cost estimates.  This is evident from the portions of the power 
function that have been calculated from the previous equation and graphed in Figure 1.  
For purposes of this illustration, Saudi Arabia alone is assumed to constitute the “cartel 
core,” with other OPEC members relegated to the competitive fringe. 
 In Figure 1, the elasticity of world demand is assumed to be –0.5.20  The elasticity 
of supply from the rest of the world (the aggregate of all non-Saudi production) is 
assumed to be +0.3, and the Saudi market share of total output is assumed to vary 
between 3% and 18% (roughly equivalent to its historical low and high).  Finally, the 
precision (λ) of the estimate of Saudi marginal cost is permitted to vary between 0.l0 and 
0.70.  Panel A of the figure shows the power of a 5% significance level test, and reveals 
that a random sample is very unlikely to reject the null hypothesis of competitive pricing 
                                                          
19 On the other hand, if the cartel or monopolist misestimates the relevant demand elasticity, and 
systematically overshoots the optimal price, then the power to reject the competitive hypothesis would be 
enhanced.  Adelman (1985, pp. 146-150) argues persuasively that this was true of OPEC during the 1970s. 
20 A greater demand elasticity would only make matters worse for the power of the test since the effect of 
greater elasticity is to push the optimal monopoly price closer to the competitive level.   
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unless marginal cost is estimated with high precision (λ ≤ 0.3).  The possibility of 
rejecting at the 1% significance level is really quite remote, as shown in Panel B.   
 One could hope, if the Saudi market share were at the very high end of the 
historical range, and if very exact estimates of marginal cost could be produced, that the 
5% significance test could be counted on to reject the competitive hypothesis—if it is 
indeed false.  The Saudi’s average share, however, is roughly 12%.  And the precision of 
marginal cost estimates seems best approximated by a coefficient of variation in the 
vicinity of 0.50.21  Subject to these conditions, the ability to reject the competitive 
hypothesis, even if it were false, is extremely low—hardly greater than the probability of 
committing a Type-I error.22 
IV.  Parallel Action and Patterns of Compensating Behavior 
 Whereas previous empirical work has been largely unsuccessful in distinguishing 
between market structures, here we apply some new tests that examine the question from 
a different perspective.  This approach focuses on the prevalence of offsetting or 
“compensating” production changes among potential rivals.  Compensating production 
behavior is the opposite of parallel action.  One producer increasing output to offset the 
decline of another is an example of compensating behavior.  Such behavior arises for 
different reasons, and with varied frequency, under alternative forms of market 
organization.  By examining the comparative static properties of equilibrium output 
adjustments, Smith (2003) demonstrates that differences in the frequency of 
compensating output changes are systematically related to the degree of interdependence 
                                                          
21 Analysis of the estimates of marginal costs for OPEC members produced by Adelman and Shahi (1989) 
suggest that the coefficient of variation is roughly 0.50 (see appendix for explanation and derivation of this 
result). 
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among producers, which provides a means for distinguishing among competitive, 
oligopolistic, and collusive behavior. 
The potential advantage of basing a test of market conduct on the degree of 
compensating behavior stems from two facts.  First, the predicted frequency of offsetting 
changes varies systematically and provides an unambiguous ordering of the principal 
market structures, as indicated by the chain of inequalities above.  Second, because this 
ordering is independent of the slopes of demand and marginal cost curves, statistical 
inferences based upon it will not be confounded by uncertainty regarding these 
background parameters.23  Specifically, with respect to the producers of a homogeneous 
product, it can be shown that: 
θcartel  >  θbe  >  θstackelberg  >  θcournot  >  θperfcomp  ≈  50%;  
where the θx represent the probability of observing offsetting production changes among 
producers operating under the respective market structures.  These encompass the 
standard forms of rivalry, denoted as follows: 
cartel: A frictionless association of producers acting essentially as a 
multi-plant monopoly; allocating output to equalize the marginal 
cost of each producer with marginal revenue of the cartel. 
be: Bertrand-Edgeworth competition, in which rivals compete via 
pricing strategies that devolve in equilibrium to pricing at marginal 
cost.  
stackelberg: The Stackelberg model is the dominant-firm variant of the Cournot 
hypothesis in which one firm acts as the “leader” and sets its 
output in correct anticipation of the reaction of the “fringe.”  
                                                                                                                                                                             
22 The limited power of performance-based tests is not confined to the world oil market.  See Phlips’ (1996) 
comments on “indistinguishability” in his presidential address to the European Economic Association. 
23 Libecap and Smith (forthcoming) examine compensating production changes on the part of Saudi Arabia 
as part of a broader inquiry into governmental policies towards oil production, but they do not extend the 
concept to study behavior of the cartel as a whole, as is done here. 
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cournot The standard Cournot model, in which it is assumed that each 
producer takes the output of rivals as given, then equates its own 
marginal cost to perceived marginal revenue.  
perfcomp The perfectly competitive benchmark, in which no firm is large 
enough to have a perceptible impact on market price, and all firms 
act as price-takers.  Smith (2003) demonstrates that if demand 
shocks are relatively small (which appears to be true of the sample 
considered here), then perfectly competitive firms would exhibit 
compensating production changes only by chance—roughly 50% 
of the time.  
 In addition to these implications of the traditional models of interdependent 
behavior, Smith (2003) considers one further, perhaps more realistic, model of collusive 
conduct.  In contrast to the frictionless cartel, envision a collusive syndicate of producers 
who operate under the weight of transactions costs, i.e., a “bureaucratic cartel.”  In this 
model, any difficulty in reaching consensus on proposed output revisions (and the profit 
redistributions that would result) constitutes an added cost.  Such transaction costs could 
easily outweigh whatever benefits would otherwise be achieved via output reallocation 
unless the scope of the proposed reallocation is substantial and expected to persist.  
Moreover, the cost of reaching consensus is likely to be higher when the proposed 
adjustments are in offsetting directions rather than in parallel.   
In consequence, the bureaucratic cartel would be expected to review output 
allocations, and perhaps change them, rather infrequently.  Many temporary shocks that 
might cause members of a frictionless cartel to adjust production levels would rightfully 
be ignored until they accumulate to a degree that justifies the cost of taking a cooperative 
decision to revise the status quo.  Compensating adjustments, especially, would tend to be 
suppressed due to the higher transaction costs they entail.  The rational result would be a 
production record in which compensating output changes are less prevalent than in the 
case of a frictionless cartel. 
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To the previous results, we can then add:  θcartel  >  θbureaucracy.  Where the 
production record of the bureaucratic cartel might rank relative to the other forms of 
market conduct depends on the magnitude of transaction costs.  If such costs are 
sufficiently large, it is possible that we could observe:  50%  >  θbureaucracy.  In other 
words, the bureaucratic cartel is the only form of interdependent behavior reviewed here 
that could conceivably fall on the “other side” of the perfectly competitive benchmark.   
 There is nominal evidence to suggest that, if OPEC does act as a cartel, then it 
must be of the second type.  Production quotas are reviewed infrequently and changed 
only if relatively large shocks have disturbed the market during the interim.  Throughout 
the twenty years during which OPEC has assigned individual quotas to each member, 
revisions have occurred less than twice per year, on average.24  There are other 
indications as well that OPEC sometimes puts off the process of revising quotas even 
after the perceived benefits to the organization have become widely apparent.25  This is a 
justifiable policy, of course, if the costs of adjustment threaten to outweigh the benefits. 
Testable Hypotheses: 
 On the basis of the preceding discussion, it is possible to rank at least some 
market structures in terms of the predicted frequency of compensating production 
changes.  Here we put forth several testable hypotheses that are relevant to the OPEC 
debate: 
H1: OPEC members exhibit compensating production changes (measured vs. the rest 
of OPEC) no less frequently than non-OPEC (i.e., competitive) producers 
(measured vs. the rest of non-OPEC output). 
                                                          
24 Revisions have occurred on average every 7.6 months, although the interval is highly variable.  Source:  
pre-1984, Claes (2001, Table 7.6); 1984-2002, Oil and Gas Journal Energy Database.  
25 See, for example, “OPEC Sits Tight Among Market-Share Thieves,” Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 
page 1, July 1, 2002. 
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 Rejection of H1 would be inconsistent with the competitive, Cournot, Bertrand-
Edgeworth, Stackelberg, and frictionless-cartel hypotheses.  It would not be 
inconsistent with the bureaucratic–cartel hypothesis, but it would be indicative 
that transactions costs within OPEC are relatively high. 
H2: OPEC members exhibit compensating production changes (measured vs. the rest 
OPEC and vs. non-OPEC output) no less frequently since the formal quota system 
was adopted than before. 
 Rejection of H2 would contradict the notion that introduction of the quota system 
has had no effect on the behavior of OPEC members, and would indicate that the 
quota system has tended to increase transactions costs within the cartel. 
H3: OPEC members exhibit compensating production changes measured vs. the rest 
of OPEC no less frequently than they do vs. the output of non-OPEC producers. 
 Rejection of H3 would be inconsistent with the competitive hypothesis, but not 
necessarily inconsistent with the cartel or other oligopolistic hypotheses. 
H4: Saudi Arabia exhibits compensating production changes (vs. output from the rest 
of OPEC and from non-OPEC producers) no more frequently than do other OPEC 
members. 
 Rejection of H4 would be inconsistent with the hypothesis that OPEC is an 
organization of equals always operating on a cooperative basis, and indicative of a 
special role (e.g., Stackelberg leader) played by the Saudis within OPEC. 
V.  Empirical Procedures 
Data: 
 The data employed to perform these tests consist of the monthly crude oil 
production series compiled by the US Energy Information Administration and published 
in the International Petroleum Monthly (2002).  These series cover each of the eleven 
current OPEC member countries, plus several other major non-OPEC producers.  The 
data represent EIA’s melding of production reports originally published by Petroleum 
Intelligence Weekly and the Oil and Gas Journal.  They deviate significantly in many 
instances from the self-reported (and perhaps self-serving) production figures published 
by the individual OPEC members. 
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 Each series extends from January 1973 through December 2001, giving 348 
monthly observations on each country’s output level.  For our purposes, the historical 
series are divided into “pre-quota” and “quota” periods.  From January 1973 through 
March 1982, OPEC assigned no formal production quotas to individual members, relying 
instead on a system of posted prices that incorporated various differentials for quality, 
location, etc.  The quota system was initiated in April 1982 and continues to the present.26 
 It is debatable whether analysis of monthly or quarterly production changes would 
provide a better test of our hypotheses.  Monthly reporting probably captures more 
random demand and supply shocks.  This is not necessarily a disadvantage since all 
producers (OPEC and non-OPEC) are buffeted by monthly shocks and our theory 
attempts to identify systematic differences in the way that potential rivals react to such 
shocks.  Of course, monthly reporting also provides three times as many observations.  
On the other hand, quarterly figures might involve smaller reporting errors, which would 
reduce bias and enhance power.  To be conservative, we report results based on monthly 
and quarterly observations.  In fact, the two sets of results are remarkably similar. 
 Output changes are measured as follows: 
 1ti
t
i
t
i qqq
−−=∆  
where “i” designates a specific producer or producer group and “t” designates the period 
for which production is reported.  Producer i is counted as having exhibited a 
compensating change vs. reference group j in any period for which:  0qq tj
t
i <∆×∆ .  The 
                                                          
26 The line of demarcation separating “pre-quota” and “quota” intervals is only approximate due to 
variations across time and countries in how the quota has been construed and enforced.  The Saudis, for 
example, initially refused to formally acknowledge a quota for themselves (1982-85), acting nominally as 
“swing producer” instead.  Iraq has remained outside the quota system altogether since 1998.  Despite 
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relative frequency of compensating production changes over the interval from T1 to T2 
can then be represented as fij:   
  ( )12
1
/
2
1
TTIf
T
Tt
t
ijij −= ∑
+=
, 
where tijI  is an indicator variable that equals 1 if  0qq
t
j
t
i <∆×∆ , and zero otherwise. 
 We are looking for systematic differences in these frequencies for different types 
of pairings; for example when the frequency of compensating changes among OPEC 
members is compared to that among non-members; or when pre-quota OPEC behavior is 
compared to subsequent behavior.  A simple F-test based on an ANOVA of observed 
frequencies would suffice, but for the apparent departure of the fij (which are proportions) 
from a normal distribution.  A standard remedy is to fit the observed proportions to a 
logistic regression model of the form: 
 ijij
ij
ij X
f1
f
ln ε+β+α=



− , [3] 
where the Xij are variables that identify the type of pairing (producer, reference group, 
quota, etc.) and the β are parameters that represent the hypothesized differences in 
behavior depending on these characteristics.  Under standard assumptions regarding the 
εij, we obtain unbiased and efficient estimates of β via Weighted Least Squares.  
Empirical Results: 
 The data are summarized in Tables 1a (monthly observations) and 1b (quarterly 
observations).  Each producer’s behavior is tabulated according to time period (before 
                                                                                                                                                                             
aberrations like this, the procedural changes that were introduced in 1982 represent an important 
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and after quota) and reference group of other producers (OPEC and non-OPEC).  Table 
entries record the percentage of total months (or quarters) in which compensating 
production changes are observed for the given pairing.  For example, Indonesia’s 
monthly production changes offset the change in the rest of OPEC 35.5% of the time 
prior to the implementation of OPEC’s quota system, but only 27.0% of the time 
thereafter.  The category “Rest of OPEC” consists of total OPEC production less the 
comparison country; i.e., total OPEC less Indonesia in the case just mentioned.  The 
category “non-OPEC” output represents total world production net of OPEC and the 
production of any non-OPEC country involved in the comparison.   
 For non-OPEC producers, the entries in Tables 1a and 1b confirm our earlier 
conjecture:  competitive producers exhibit compensating production changes nearly 50% 
of the time, as if the changes occurred by chance.  This is true whether output variations 
of individual non-OPEC producers are being compared to variations from the rest of the 
non-OPEC world (the figures shown in Table 1), or simply to the production of other 
individual non-OPEC producers (not shown).   
 To determine whether behavior of OPEC members deviates significantly from 
that of non-OPEC (i.e., competitive) producers, we turn to the logistic regressions, which 
are summarized in Table 2.  To capture all of the hypothesized effects (H1-H5), three 
versions of the model are estimated, first on the basis of monthly observations (panel a), 
then quarterly (panel b).  The following explanatory variables are used: 
 OPEC = 1 if producer is OPEC member, 
  = 0 otherwise. 
 Quota = 1 if after March 1982 and producer is OPEC member, 
  = 0 otherwise. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
institutional change that might have altered behavior; and that contrast is what we examine below. 
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 Saudi = 1 if producer is Saudi Arabia, 
  = 0 otherwise. 
 v NOPEC = 1 if comparison is to non-OPEC production, 
  = 0 otherwise. 
 We begin with hypothesis H1.  On average over the entire period (pre- and post-
quota), Table 1a (monthly data ) showed that OPEC members exhibit compensating 
behavior vs. the rest of OPEC 33.0% of the time, whereas non-OPEC members exhibit 
compensating behavior vs. non-OPEC output more frequently, 45.8% of the time.  The 
negative coefficient of “OPEC” in Model 1a (see Table 2) proves this difference to be 
highly significant (99% confidence, one-tailed test) based on the monthly data.  
Moreover, this result is confirmed by analysis of the quarterly data, where the t-statistic 
grows even larger (see Model 1b).  We conclude that OPEC members have exhibited 
significantly less compensating behavior than their non-OPEC counterparts.  This 
constitutes a strong rejection of H1, which implies also a strong rejection of the 
competitive, Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand-Edgeworth, and frictionless cartel models of 
OPEC behavior in favor of the bureaucratic-cartel alternative. 
 The first model also permits a test of the impact of the quota system (hypothesis 
H2).  Because the quotas do not bind output of non-OPEC producers, the “Quota” 
variable is introduced as an interaction effect that applies only to OPEC members and 
only after the quota was introduced.27  Based on monthly data (Model 1a), the estimated 
coefficient is significantly less than zero (95% confidence), meaning that compensating 
behavior among OPEC producers occurred less frequently after March 1982.  In contrast, 
compensating behavior among the control group of non-OPEC producers hardly varies 
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between periods, 45.2% before vs. 46.4% after (see Table 1a), which suggests that it was 
the quota system rather than changes in the broader market that tended to suppress 
compensating production changes within OPEC.  Based on these results from the 
monthly data, H2 would be rejected.   
 The quarterly data tell a somewhat different story about the quota.  Based on 
Model 1b, the quota system appears to have had little or no effect on the frequency with 
which OPEC members offset variations from the rest of OPEC.  As noted when testing 
H1, less compensating behavior is seen among OPEC producers than among non-OPEC 
producers, but the magnitude of that difference is (according to the quarterly data) not 
affected by introduction of the quota.  How to resolve the conflict between monthly and 
quarterly results?  It may be that the quarterly data are freer of reporting errors and 
provide a more accurate picture.  That interpretation will be challenged, however, by 
some further results we come to later.  For the moment, the apparent contradiction must 
remain a puzzle. 
 We move now to the second model for a test of H3, the hypothesis that OPEC 
producers offset (internal) changes in the output of the rest of OPEC no less frequently 
than they offset (external) changes in non-OPEC production.  The monthly and quarterly 
data agree completely in this regard:  hypothesis H3 is strongly rejected, as indicated by 
the significant positive coefficients associated with the variable “v NOPEC” in Models 2a 
and 2b.  Evidently, OPEC producers are much more likely to offset output changes that 
originate outside the group than those that come from within.  This aspect of OPEC 
behavior is inconsistent with the competitive hypothesis, but entirely consistent with the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
27 When a separate term is introduced in the equation to show the response of non-OPEC producers to the 
quota, it is indistinguishable from zero.  To save space we report only the results where that term is 
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behavior of a bureaucratic cartel that incurs relatively high transaction costs whenever 
market shares shift within the cartel. 
 The second model also revisits the impact of the quota system, this time weighing 
both internal and external adjustments together:  OPEC producers became significantly 
less likely to offset production changes (whether emanating from within or without) after 
quotas were introduced.  This is demonstrated by the highly significant (99% confidence) 
negative coefficients on the “Quota” variables in Models 2a and 2b.  It may be possible, 
through more extensive use of dummy variables and further partitioning of the sample 
period, to more clearly identify the impact of the quota system.  A case in point is Iraq, 
which has been exempt from the quota system since July 1998.  While subject to quotas 
in previous quarters, Iraq had exhibited compensating changes relative to the rest of 
OPEC 30.8% of the time, but since its exemption this has risen to 50%—virtually 
indistinguishable from the group of non-OPEC producers, who are of course also exempt 
from quotas. 
 On balance, the evidence regarding the quota system strongly suggests that it has 
had the effect of increasing transaction costs—perhaps more so for certain types of 
production adjustments than others.  But, the finding of increased transactions cost should 
not come as a surprise, even for those who would have expected the formalization of this 
control device to have enhanced cartel operations.  It hardly seems implausible that the 
process of reaching consensus became more problematic once each member’s stake in the 
outcome had to be set forth explicitly and mutually agreed. 
 There are certain indications in the raw data (see Tables 1a and 1b) that Saudi 
Arabia may have played a special role within OPEC, contrary to hypothesis H4.  Unlike 
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the rest of OPEC, for example, the Saudis actually increased the frequency of 
compensating production changes after quotas were introduced, whether measured by 
monthly or quarterly changes.  That is what one would have expected to observe if, as 
announced at the time the quota system was adopted in 1982, the Kingdom in fact 
assumed a more deliberate role as swing producer.  However, the statistical evidence to 
support this view is weak, and on this point the results from monthly and quarterly 
observations again coincide.  The variable that distinguishes Saudi behavior from other 
OPEC producers in Models 2a and 2b is not significantly different from zero in either 
equation.28  Although the sign of the coefficient would tend to refute H4, the lack of 
significance undermines support for the proposition that the Saudis have played a special 
role.  The data are simply inconclusive on this point; Saudi leadership is not ruled out, 
nor ruled in.  If the Kingdom has assumed the role of Stackelberg leader, dominant firm, 
or swing producer, it must not have been pursued with enough vigor and continuity, 
either before or after the quota system was adopted, to have left a discernable pattern in 
the data.29 
VI.  Summary and Conclusions 
 Although the proponents of competitive, cooperative, and oligopolistic 
hypotheses have all had their say, little consensus has yet been reached regarding the 
                                                          
28 There is no appreciable change in the coefficients of these equations or their significance levels when the 
output of non-Saudi members are compared to the rest of non-Saudi-OPEC.  Moreover, when the Saudi 
dummy variable is dropped from the equation, the results are again essentially unchanged.  To save space, 
those results are not reported here.   
29 Some ambiguity exists in the literature regarding the terms “swing producer” and “residual supplier.”  
These are often construed to mean that one producer offsets variations in the output of others to whatever 
extent may be needed to “defend” a pre-determined price level.  In this sense, a profit-maximizing 
dominant firm is not a swing producer because its optimal price varies with the production levels adopted 
by the others.  A swing producer or residual supplier, defined as above, should exhibit compensating 
production changes more often than a dominant firm or Stackelberg leader, since the response of the swing 
producer to fluctuations in output of the fringe is not damped by the countervailing change in optimal price. 
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nature and influence of OPEC.  The lingering debate undoubtedly stems from many 
factors, and may encounter new obstacles as events in the world oil market continue to 
unfold.  One point seems clear, however:  research to date has been inconclusive in part 
due to the relatively low power of statistical tests employed. 
 Performance-based tests of market structure are, at least concerning the world oil 
market, inherently difficult because they must overcome a relatively high degree of 
uncertainty regarding the magnitude of marginal costs and the structure of demand, and 
they are complicated by the necessity of distinguishing Ricardian rents (and perhaps user 
costs) from monopoly profits.  Accordingly, we have devised tests based on behavioral 
predictions that are largely invariant with respect to unknown values of these background 
parameters.   
 When these tests are applied to the members of OPEC and their rivals, the results 
are quite clear:  OPEC is much more than a non-cooperative oligopoly, but much less 
than a frictionless cartel.  All traditional explanations of OPEC behavior (i.e., 
competitive, Cournot, dominant-firm, etc.) are strongly rejected, except the hypothesis 
that OPEC acts as a bureaucratic cartel; i.e., a cooperative enterprise weighed down by 
the cost of forging consensus among members, and therefore partially impaired in pursuit 
of the common good.  The evidence also suggests that OPEC’s formal quota system, 
introduced in 1982 to replace the old posted-price scheme, has increased transactions 
costs within the organization and pushed behavior further away from the ideal of a pure 
and frictionless cartel.  Whether that also means that the quota system failed to enhance 
the performance of the cartel is unclear.  There is little evidence to indicate that Saudi 
Arabia has acted as a “leader” or dominant firm within the cartel, although that 
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possibility cannot be formally rejected either.  If the Saudis have performed such a role, 
then at least we can say that it has not been executed with sufficient vigor or consistency 
to be clearly discernable in the data. 
 This paper has examined the conduct of members of an alleged cartel, not the 
performance of the cartel itself.  Any conclusions regarding the effectiveness of OPEC’s 
cooperative actions, or the organization’s impact on market prices and member profits, 
are therefore beyond the scope of this research.  A cartel’s actions may be in vain if it 
lacks either the information base to anticipate, or the operating flexibility to respond to 
market forces.  Whether the rewards reaped by OPEC have actually gone beyond what 
one could expect of a non-cooperative oligopoly is not clear.  That part of the question 
remains. 
 Inscrutable OPEC   32
References 
Adelman, M. A. (1980).  “The Clumsy Cartel,” The Energy Journal, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 43-
53. 
Adelman, M. A. (1982).  “OPEC as a Cartel,” in OPEC Behavior and World Oil Prices, 
J. Griffin and D. Teece, eds., London:  Allen & Unwin, pp. 37-57. 
Adelman, M. A. (1992).  “Finding and Development Costs in the United States, 1945-
86,” in J. R. Moroney, ed., Advances in the Economics of Energy and Resources, 
vol. 7, Greenwich, CT:  JAI Press. 
Adelman, M. A. (1995).  The Genie Out of the Bottle, Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press. 
Adelman, M. A. (2002).  “World Oil Production and Prices:  1947-2000,” in Oil and the 
Economy:  Recent Experience in Historical Perspective, James L. Smith, ed., 
(Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, vol. 42, no. 2), pp. 169-191. 
Adelman, M.A., and Manoj Shahi (1989).  “Oil Development-Operating Cost Estimates, 
1955-85,” Energy Economics, vol. 11, pp. 2-10. 
Alhajji, A. F., and David Huettner (2000a).  “The Target Revenue Model and the World 
Oil Market:  Empirical Evidence from 1971 to 1994,” The Energy Journal, vol. 
21, no. 2, pp. 121-143. 
Alhajji, A. F., and David Huettner (2000b).  “OPEC and World Crude Oil Markets from 
1973 to 1994: Cartel, Oligopoly, or Competitive?” The Energy Journal, vol. 21, 
no. 3, pp. 31-60. 
Amuzegar, Jahangir (1999).  Managing the Oil Wealth:  OPEC’s Windfalls and Pitfalls, 
London: I.B. Tauris Publishers. 
Claes, Dag Harald (2001).  The Politics of Oil-Producer Cooperation, Boulder, CO:  
Westview Press. 
Dahl, Carol and Mine Yücel (1991).  “Testing Alternative Hypotheses of Oil Producer 
Behavior,” The Energy Journal, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 117-138. 
Gately, Dermot (1984).  “A Ten-Year Retrospective:  OPEC and the World Oil Market,” 
Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 22, pp. 1100-1114. 
Gault, John, Charles Spierer, Jean-Luc Bertholet, and Bahman Karbassioun (1999), 
“How Does OPEC Allocate Quotas?” Journal of Energy Finance & 
Development, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 137-148. 
Geroski, P. A., A. M. Ulph, and D. T. Ulph (1987).  “A Model of the Crude Oil Market in 
which Market Conduct Varies,” The Economic Journal, vol. 97 (Conference), pp. 
77-86. 
Green, David Jay (1988).  “The World Oil Market:  An Examination Using Small-Scale 
Models,” The Energy Journal, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 61-77. 
Griffin, James M. (1985).  “OPEC Behavior:  A Test of Alternative Hypotheses,” 
American Economic Review, vol. 75, no. 5, pp. 954-963. 
 Inscrutable OPEC   33
Griffin, James M., and William S. Nielson (1994).  “The 1985-86 Oil Price Collapse and 
Afterwards:  What Does Game Theory Add?” Economic Inquiry, vol. 32, pp. 543-
561. 
Gülen, S. Gürcan (1996).  “Is OPEC a Cartel?  Evidence from Cointegration and 
Causality Tests,” The Energy Journal, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 43-57. 
International Petroleum Monthly (2002).  US Energy Information Administration, 
Washington, DC (various issues). 
Jones, Clifton T. (1990).  “OPEC Behavior Under Falling Prices:  Implications for Cartel 
Stability,” The Energy Journal, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 117-129. 
Kohl, Wilfrid L. (2002).  “OPEC Behavior, 1998-2001,” in Oil and the Economy:  Recent 
Experience in Historical Perspective, James L. Smith, ed., (Quarterly Review of 
Economics and Finance, vol. 42, no. 2), pp. 209-233. 
Levin, Dan (1988).  “Stackelberg, Cournot and Collusive Monopoly: Performance and 
Welfare Comparisons,” Economic Inquiry, vol. 26, pp. 317-330. 
Libecap, Gary D. (1989).  “The Political Economy of Crude Oil Cartelization in the 
United States, 1933-1972,” The Journal of Economic History, vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 
833-855. 
Libecap, Gary D. and James L. Smith (forthcoming).  “Political Constraints on 
Government Cartelization:  The Case of Oil Production Regulation in Texas and 
Saudi Arabia,” in How Cartels Endure and How They Fail: Studies of Industrial 
Collusion, Peter Grossman, ed., Cheltenham, UK:  Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 
Loderer, Claudio (1985).  “A Test of the OPEC Cartel Hypothesis:  1974-1983,” Journal 
of Finance, vol. 40, no. 3, pp. 991-1008. 
Mabro, Robert (1998).  “OPEC Behaviour 1960-1998:  A Review of the Literature,” 
Journal of Energy Literature, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 3-27. 
Mitchell, John, et. al. (2001).  The New Economy of Oil, London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs. 
Oil and Gas Journal Energy Database (2002).  PennWell Corporation, Tulsa, OK. 
Oil Market Intelligence (2002).  Energy Intelligence Group, New York, NY (various 
issues). 
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly (2002).  Energy Intelligence Group, New York, NY 
(various issues). 
Phlips, Louis (1996).  “On the Detection of Collusion and Predation,” European 
Economic Review, vol. 40, pp. 495-510. 
Ramcharran, Harri (2002).  “Oil Production Responses to Price Changes:  An Empirical 
Application of the Competitive Model to OPEC and non-OPEC Countries,” 
Energy Economics, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 97-106. 
Smith, James L. (2003).  “Distinguishable Patterns of Competition, Collusion, and 
Parallel Action,” May 5, 2003 (mimeo). 
 Inscrutable OPEC   34
Spilimbergo, Antonio (2001).  “Testing the Hypothesis of Collusive Behavior Among 
OPEC Members,” Energy Economics, vol. 23, pp. 339-353. 
Stigler, George (1964). “A Theory of Oligopoly,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 72, 
no. 2, pp. 44-61. 
Watkins, G. Campbell, and Shane S. Streifel (1998).  “World Crude Oil Supply:  
Evidence from Estimating Supply Functions by Country,” Journal of Energy 
Finance and Development, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 23-48. 
 Inscrutable OPEC  35 
 
Figure 1a: Power Function
 5% Significance Level
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80
coefficient of variation (marginal cost)
Pr
 [r
ej
ec
t c
om
pe
tit
io
n|
m
on
op
ol
y]
3% share 12% share 18% share
 
 
 
Figure 1b: Power Function
 1% Significance Level
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80
coefficient of variation (marginal cost)
Pr
 [r
ej
ec
t c
om
pe
tit
io
n|
m
on
op
ol
y]
3% share 12% share 18% share
 
 
 
 Inscrutable OPEC  36 
Table 1a:  Frequency of Compensating Production Changes
(Monthly Observations)
vs. Rest of OPEC* vs. non-OPEC*
Country pre-quota quota overall pre-quota quota overall
Algeria 17.3% 16.0% 16.7% 19.1% 15.6% 17.4%
Indonesia 35.5% 27.0% 31.3% 47.3% 31.2% 39.3%
Iran 33.6% 37.1% 35.4% 39.1% 38.0% 38.6%
Iraq 35.5% 31.6% 33.6% 30.9% 36.7% 33.8%
Kuwait 36.4% 33.3% 34.9% 42.7% 41.4% 42.1%
Libya 40.0% 17.3% 28.7% 49.1% 18.1% 33.6%
Nigeria 41.8% 35.9% 38.9% 49.1% 41.8% 45.5%
Qatar 42.7% 26.6% 34.7% 44.5% 32.5% 38.5%
UAE 44.5% 27.8% 36.2% 50.9% 36.3% 43.6%
Venezuela 46.4% 28.7% 37.6% 50.9% 28.7% 39.8%
Saudi Arabia 33.6% 37.1% 35.4% 36.4% 43.9% 40.2%
OPEC average 37.0% 28.9% 33.0% 41.8% 33.1% 37.5%
Canada 50.9% 51.9% 51.4%
Mexico 37.3% 49.4% 43.4%
Norway 50.9% 39.7% 45.3%
Russia 48.2% 43.0% 45.6%
UK 32.7% 44.7% 38.7%
US 50.9% 49.8% 50.4%
Non-OPEC avg. 45.2% 46.4% 45.8%
* "Non-OPEC" consists of worldwide production, less OPEC output and production of any Non-OPEC country to which it is 
compared.  "Rest of OPEC" consists of all OPEC production, less the production of any OPEC country to which it is 
compared.
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Table 1b:  Frequency of Compensating Production Changes
(Quarterly Observations)
vs. Rest of OPEC* vs. non-OPEC*
Country pre-quota quota overall pre-quota quota overall
Algeria 25.0% 21.5% 23.3% 50.0% 30.4% 40.2%
Indonesia 41.7% 38.0% 39.9% 47.2% 48.1% 47.7%
Iran 33.3% 35.4% 34.4% 55.6% 39.2% 47.4%
Iraq 33.3% 34.2% 33.8% 38.9% 22.8% 30.9%
Kuwait 22.2% 35.4% 28.8% 55.6% 40.5% 48.1%
Libya 36.1% 22.8% 29.5% 58.3% 35.4% 46.9%
Nigeria 38.9% 36.7% 37.8% 47.2% 41.8% 44.5%
Qatar 38.9% 32.9% 35.9% 55.6% 34.2% 44.9%
UAE 22.2% 32.9% 27.6% 50.0% 43.0% 46.5%
Venezuela 41.7% 36.7% 39.2% 58.3% 35.4% 46.9%
Saudi Arabia 33.3% 35.4% 34.4% 41.7% 43.0% 42.4%
OPEC average 33.3% 32.9% 33.1% 50.8% 37.6% 44.2%
Canada 63.9% 55.7% 59.8%
Mexico 33.3% 48.1% 40.7%
Norway 47.2% 39.2% 43.2%
Russia 19.4% 39.2% 29.3%
UK 61.1% 38.0% 49.6%
US 50.0% 55.7% 52.9%
Non-OPEC avg. 45.8% 46.0% 45.9%
* "Non-OPEC" consists of worldwide production, less OPEC output and production of any Non-OPEC country to 
which it is compared.  "Rest of OPEC" consists of all OPEC production, less the production of any OPEC country to 
which it is compared.
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Table 2:  Estimated Logistic Equations
(absolute value of asymptotic t-statistics in parens)
A. Monthly Observations
Model/Sample constant OPEC Quota Saudi v NOPEC R2 N
Model 1a: Like vs. Like1 -0.156 -0.402 -0.041 0.50 34
(1.80) (2.75) (1.96)
Model 2a: OPEC vs. All2 -0.528 -0.364 0.221 0.205 0.31 44
(4.66) (3.07) (1.18) (1.82)
B. Quarterly Observations
Model/Sample constant OPEC Quota Saudi v NOPEC R2 N
Model 1b: Like vs. Like1 -0.148 -0.551 0.003 0.35 34
(1.50) (3.29) (0.07)
Model 2b: OPEC vs. All2 -0.498 -0.288 0.049 0.366 0.45 44
(5.17) (2.90) (0.31) (3.96)
1
2
Sample: Each of eleven OPEC members vs. output from the rest of OPEC, and each of six non-OPEC 
producers vs. output from the rest of non-OPEC; before and after the quota was introduced.
Sample: Each of eleven OPEC members vs. output from rest of OPEC and vs. output from non-OPEC; 
before and after the quota was introduced.
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APPENDIX 
1.  The Precision of Marginal Cost Estimates 
 Adelman and Shahi (1989) estimate development and operating cost ($/barrel) on 
an annual basis over the interval 1970-85 for each OPEC member country.30  In fact, they 
provide two figures, one estimate adjusted for the prevalence of offshore operations in 
each country (see their Table 10.5) and one estimate unadjusted by this factor (Table 
10.4).  The estimates for each country vary from year to year, substantially in some cases.  
As Adelman and Shahi point out, annual variations may be due in part to the 
phenomenon of reservoir depletion and in part to innovations in technology.  Another 
source of variation comes simply from the random fluctuations in drilling results, 
expenditure levels, factor prices, reporting methods and classification errors, etc. that 
enter each year, directly or indirectly, into the cost estimation process. 
 To assess the magnitude of these random factors, I proceed as follows.  The true 
marginal cost of development for a given country is unobservable, but may be assumed to 
vary smoothly from year to year, following a quadratic function over the period 1970-85.  
The quadratic form is general enough to permit rising, then falling costs if technological 
progress is sufficient to overcome the effects of depletion, or vice versa.  After fitting the 
annual Adelman-Shahi cost estimates to a quadratic function, country-by-country, the 
“residuals” serve as a proxy for the random sources of variation.  Based on these 
residuals, there are two ways to estimate the coefficient of variation: (1) after converting 
the residual errors to percentage terms, then calculate the standard deviation of the errors 
over the sample period, or (2) divide the standard error of the estimated equation by the 
                                                          
30 Adelman and Shahi also provide estimates for some prior years, but the coverage is sketchy prior to 
1970. 
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average cost for the whole period.  The second method produces a smaller estimate of the 
coefficient of variation in this instance, and to be conservative in my own argument I 
report only those results here. 
 Table A1 shows the estimated coefficient of variation for each country, based on 
Adelman and Shahi’s “unadjusted” cost estimates as well as the “adjusted” cost 
estimates.31  For the fifteen OPEC regions taken together, the coefficient of variation 
ranges between 21% and 174%.  The various ways of taking an average center 
approximately around 50%. 
standard error / mean cost
Region "unadjusted" "adjusted"
Venezuela 21% 35%
Nigeria 58% 58%
Libya 93% 89%
Indonesia 78% 74%
Gabon 27% 28%
Ecuador* 100% 113%
Saudi Arabia 44% 31%
Qatar 49% 46%
Neutral Zone 59% 61%
Kuwait 103% 91%
Iraq 174% 43%
Iran 26% 25%
Algeria 27% 43%
Dubai 38% 35%
Abu Dhabi 43% 45%
Simple Average 63% 54%
Weighted Average** 60% 46%
*  1970 and 1971 cost estimates excluded.  See text.
Table A1:  Coefficients of Variation
** Weights based on 2002 Q2 production levels, as reported by 
Energy Intelligence Group, Oil Market Intelligence , August 2002.  
                                                          
31 To be conservative, I have thrown out the Ecuadorian cost estimates for 1970 and 1971 because they are 
rather spectacular outliers that would have substantially inflated the estimated coefficient of variation. 
